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1.    Introduction 
 
The need for an effective and expedient method of settling labour disputes, 
particularly collective disputes involving employers and trade unions, preoccupied the 
British Colonial Administration in Malaya in the early 1940’s.  Strikes, frequent and 
involving large numbers of workers were hampering the economic development of the 
Colony and adversely affecting the economic interests of colonial entrepreneurs.  
Added to this was the threat posed to Britain’s political hegemony as history has 
recorded that these early labour up-risings were fanned by Communist ideology.1  The 
concept of voluntary arbitration was introduced in 1940 when an Industrial Court was 
established under the Industrial Court Enactment 1940 (Federated Malay States).  
However, due to the outbreak of war, the Enactment of 1940 was never implemented. 
Subsequently, this early piece of legislation was replaced by the Industrial Courts 
Ordinance 1948, and the Trade Disputes Ordinance 1949. 
 
However, voluntary arbitration as a method of settling labour disputes did not 
work in Malaysia.  From 1948 to about 1963, only six disputes were referred to the 
Industrial Court, and in its twenty-year span from 1948 to 1967, the Industrial Court 
only made 18 awards.  Some reasons offered for this failure include the apathy on the 
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1 Gamba, C., The Origins of Trade Unionism in Malaya, (1962) Eastern Universities Press, Ltd., S’pore. 
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 part of employers and the preference of parties to disputes for the direct action of 
strikes, which have been known to yield the desired results.2 
As the newly-independent Malaysian state found itself beset by strikes in most 
of its essential services, the catalyst for change came in the form of a political crisis – 
Indonesia’s confrontation with Malaysia which resulted in the need to maintain 
uninterrupted essential services and general discipline in the labour force.  The 
government declared an Emergency during which the Essential (Arbitration in the 
Essential Services) Regulations 1965 was passed which introduced the system of 
compulsory arbitration of trade disputes in Malaysia.  This system remains in force 
until today. 
 
 
2.   The Statutory Scheme under the Industrial Relations Act 1967 for          
the Prevention and Settlement of Disputes 
 
The Industrial Relations Act 19673 [“IRA”] provides for three main methods 
of dealing with trade disputes - conciliation, fact-finding (inquiry) and finally 
arbitration.4  When a trade dispute5 exists or is apprehended, an employer or trade 
union of workmen who are parties to the dispute may report the same to the Director 
General of Industrial Relations (DGIR).6  However, the DGIR is empowered, whether 
or not a trade dispute has been reported to him, to take such steps as may be necessary 
or expedient for promoting a settlement of the trade dispute if he deems it necessary in 
the public interest to do so.7   Among the steps which the DGIR might take for the 
settlement of trade disputes is to have the dispute referred to any machinery which 
already exists by virtue of agreement between the parties.8  Only where the DGIR is 
                                                 
2 M. Ali Raza, “Legislative and Public Policy Developments in Malaysia’s Industrial Relations”, The 
Journal of Developing Areas, Vol. 3 (April 1969), pp 355, 356. 
3 Act 177. 
4 Ayadurai, D., Industrial Relations in Malaysia, (1998) MLJ, p. 81. 
5 “trade dispute” is defined as any dispute between an employer and his workmen which is connected 
with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or the conditions of work of 
any such workmen – IRA, s. 2. 
6 Industrial Relations Act, 1967, s. 18(1). 
7 ibid, s. 18(3). 
8 ibid, s. 18(4). 
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 satisfied that there is no likelihood of the trade dispute being settled that he must 
notify the Minister.9 
 
Under “conciliation”, the disputed parties have to attend a conference to be 
presided over by the DGIR or such other person as he may appoint.10  The Minister is 
empowered to enter into conciliation proceedings “at any time, if he considers it 
necessary or expedient...”11  Thus, the Minister is not dependant upon the DGIR’s 
reporting procedure. 
 
The IRA also empowers the Minister to appoint a Committee of Investigation 
or a Board of Inquiry and may refer to the Committee or Board any matter connected 
with or relevant to the dispute.12  The Committee is empowered to “investigate the 
causes and circumstances” of any trade dispute or matter referred to it.13   A Board on 
the other hand is empowered with the discretion to inquire into any matter referred to 
it either in public or in private, and report thereon to the Minister.14  Any report of the 
Board has to be laid as soon as may be before the Dewan Rakyat,15 (Lower House of 
Parliament) and the Minister may publish or cause to be published any information or 
conclusion arrived at by the Board as a result of or in the course of its inquiry.16 
 
If a trade dispute is not otherwise resolved, the Minister is empowered to refer 
the dispute to the Industrial Court on the joint request in writing of a trade union of 
workmen and the employer who are parties to the dispute.17  However, the Minister 
“may of his own motion” refer any trade dispute to the court if he is satisfied that it is 
expedient to do so.18  Thus, the arbitration process may be initiated by the Minister 
without having to await notification from the DGIR that he has failed to cause the 
dispute to be settled, thus bringing the conciliation proceedings to a pre-mature end.  
Statute imposes no duty upon the disputing parties to enter into conciliation, and 
                                                 
9 ibid, 18(5). 
10 ibid, S. 19(2). 
11 ibid, s. 19A. 
12 IRA, s. 34. 
13 ibid, s. 35(1). 
14 ibid, s. 37(1). 
15 ibid., s. 37(3). 
16 ibid., s. 37(4). 
17 IRA, s. 26(1). 
18 ibid., s. 26(2). 
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 indeed conciliation is not a necessary first step prior to arbitration.  Although the Act 
recognises industry arrangements for the settlement of trade disputes, the Minister has 
the discretion to override those arrangements if in his opinion it is unlikely that the 
dispute would be expeditiously settled through those arrangements.19 
 
(a) Employer/  DGIR          Minister               Industrial 
Trade Union           Court 
 Ordinary flow of dispute-settlement process. 
 
(b) Employer/        Minister      Industrial 
 Trade Union           Court 
 
Where the Minister may intervene, either to bring conciliation to an end 
or to have the dispute referred straight to the Industrial Court, without 
undergoing the conciliation process. 
 
Apart from the settlement of trade disputes, another important dispute covered 
by the IRA relates to unfair dismissals, which, in Malaysia is governed by the concept 
of dismissal without just cause or excuse under section 20(1) of the IRA.  When an 
employee, irrespective of whether he is a member of a trade union or otherwise, 
considers that he has been dismissed without just cause or excuse, he is entitled to 
make a representation in writing  to the DGIR.  Upon receipt of the representation, the 
DGIR must “take such steps as he may consider necessary or expedient” in order to 
settle the dispute as expeditiously as possible.  Where the DGIR is satisfied that there 
is no likelihood of the representation being settled, he must notify the Minister.  The 
Minister is given the discretion whether or not to have the dispute referred to the 
Industrial Court: 
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19 ibid, s. 26(3). 
  
 
(c) Dismissal  DGIR                        Minister  Industrial Court. 
 
(broken line denotes that Minister has discretion whether or not to refer 
dispute to court, and so, where dispute is not referred, it is “settled” at the 
Ministerial level).. 
 
In Malaysia, conciliation is undertaken principally by government servants, 
that is, officers of the Industrial Relations Department of the Ministry of Human 
Resource.  There are no autonomous bodies authorised by law to undertake 
conciliation services.  At the time the Industrial Relations laws were drafted, Malaysia 
was still very much a newly-emergent nation with industrialisation in its early stages.  
The task of conciliation was given to government servants as “in most newly 
emergent nations of Asia, government servants continue to enjoy the prestige 
accorded to them during the colonial era.”20  Hence, it was felt that these persons were 
suitable as they could command the respect and confidence of the parties concerned. 
 
Statistics from the Ministry of Human Resource seem to show that conciliation 
has been a success and a primary contributor to the settlement of labour disputes: 
                                                 
20 Chelvasingam – MacIntyre, “Industrial Arbitration and Government’s role in the field of Industrial 
Relations” [1971] 2 MLJ xlv.  
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 Table I 
Settlement of industrial/trade disputes 
 1998 1999 
Disputes carried forward 268 329 
Disputes reported 442 496 
Total 710 825 
Settled 381 374 
Mode of Settlement   
Conciliation 277 352 
Referred to Industrial Court 71 22 
Not referred 33   0 
Total 381 374 
Source: Annual Report,  Ministry of Human Resource 
 
 
 
Table II 
Settlement of Dismissal Cases 
 
        1998        1999 
Disputes carried forward 2,123 4,275 
Disputes reported 8,819 5,639 
Total 10,942 9,644 
Settled 6,667 5,133 
Mode of Settlement   
Conciliation 5,003 3,346 
Referred to Industrial Court 886 1,419 
Not referred 778   368 
Total 6,667 5,133 
Source: Annual Report,  Ministry of Human Resource 
 
 
The statistics show that conciliation has been a success where collective labour 
disputes are concerned (Table i), where settlement of disputes through conciliation is 
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 at 73% in 1998 and 94% in 1999.  However, conciliation has not been as successful in 
the settlement of disputes pertaining to dismissal (Table ii).  The failure of 
conciliation as a method of settlement here places the burden of settlement upon the 
Industrial Court.  As Table (iii) shows, of the total number of cases arbitrated by the 
Industrial Court in a year, a large percentage comprise cases pertaining to termination, 
ie, in 1994, 81%; in 1995, 80%; in 1996, 72.8%; in 1997, 74.5% and in 1998, 72%. 
 
Table III 
Malaysia: Type of Cases Arbitrated by the Industrial Court, 1994-1998 
 
Type of Cases 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Termination Cases 
Constructive 
Misconduct 
Retrenchment 
 
15 
439 
9 
 
26 
410 
4 
 
19 
366 
50 
 
34 
407 
14 
 
58 
403 
17 
Non-Termination Cases 
Non-Compliance of Award 
Non-Compliance of Collective Agreement 
Interpretation of Award/Collective Agreement 
Variation of Award/Collective Agreement 
Amendments to Collective Agreement (By Court 
Order) 
Collective Agreement (Terms and Conditions) 
Questions of Law 
Victimisation 
 
15 
12 
10 
7 
- 
48 
14 
- 
 
 
41 
14 
12 
3 
- 
30 
9 
- 
 
67 
16 
10 
1 
- 
57 
10 
1 
 
60 
30 
5 
2 
- 
49 
9 
1 
 
69 
42 
28 
12 
- 
26 
5 
4 
 
Total 569 549 597 611 664 
Source: Industrial Court, Ministry of Human Resources 
 
The relative success of conciliation in cases of collective labour disputes as 
opposed to individual disputes can be explained from the perspective of the way in 
which industrial adjudication operates in Malaysia, in particular the exercise of 
judicial review by the civil courts over inferior courts or tribunals such as the 
Industrial Court. 
 7
  
 
3. Powers of the Industrial Court, and the Effect of Judicial Review 
 
As in other specialist tribunals established by statute to resolve particular 
disputes, the Malaysian Industrial Court is imbued with broad powers and jurisdiction, 
not confined in its operation by technicalities or legal form. Among its more 
important provisions are the following: 
 
(3) The court shall make its award without delay and where practicable 
within thirty days from the date of reference to it of the trade dispute or of a 
reference to it under section 20(3). 
 
(4) In making its award in respect of a trade dispute, the court shall have 
regard to the public interest, the financial implications and the effect of the 
award on the economy of the country, and on the industry concerned, and also 
to the probable effect in related or similar industries. 
 
(5) The court shall act according to equity, good conscience and the 
substantial merits of the case without regard to technicalities and legal form. 
 
(6) In making its sward, the court shall not be restricted to the specific 
relief claimed by the parties or to the demands made by the parties in the 
course of the trade dispute or in the matter of the reference to it under section 
20(3) but may include in the award any matter or thing which it thinks 
necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the trade dispute or the 
reference to it under section 20(3). 
 
 
There is no right of appeal from the decision of the Industrial Court to a higher 
court, and there is no special appellate court created for the settlement of labour 
disputes.  Instead, an award decision or order of the court shall be final and conclusive, 
and shall not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question 
in any court. 
 
The Industrial Court is not the only decision-maker in cases of labour disputes, 
particularly collective disputes.  Broad discretionary powers are also conferred upon 
members of the Executive, such as the Minister and the Director-General of Industrial 
Relations to make “final decisions”, for example in cases of trade union recognition 
disputes.  Statutory conferment of wide discretionary powers coupled with the 
 8
 presence of ouster or privative clauses has led to the healthy growth of administrative 
law in the field of Malaysian industrial relations.  However, the application of 
principles of administrative law by the civil courts in their exercise of judicial review 
has not been consistent.  In collective labour disputes, where decisions have been 
made by members of the executive, for example to award recognition to a particular 
trade union or to deny representation rights to a class of workers, the civil courts have 
been slow to interfere with the exercise of executive powers and adopts a broad 
almost expansive approach in order to give effect to the actions of the executive.21  In 
the case of dismissal without just cause or excuse, the civil courts appear to adopt the 
stance that such disputes, in order to be better adjudicated in the interest of justice to 
the affected party, ought to be referred to the Industrial court.22  If the Minister fails to 
refer such disputes to the Industrial Court, he must have good reasons for not doing so 
and must clearly explain those reasons, otherwise, it will be presumed that he had no 
good reasons for the failure to make the reference.  Hence a good deal of disputes on 
dismissals end up at the Industrial Court while most collective disputes would be 
settled, either by the parties concerned or by executive decision. 
 
 
4.  The Future of ADR as a dispute-solving mechanism for labour  
disputes in Malaysia 
 
Although official statistics look impressive, many labour lawyers in Malaysia 
are of the opinion that conciliation as a method of dispute-resolution for labour 
disputes does not work as well as it should.  Conciliation is carried out by government 
servants with no formal training in ADR or even exposure to it, but who are expected 
to learn on the job.  Secondly, while disputes continue to increase, there is a limitation 
on the number of officers available to undertake conciliation, as it is not easy to 
increase the number of officers due to government budgetary constraints.  The above 
problems coupled with increasing legalism due to judicial review has prompted moves 
to alter the fundamental character of the Industrial Court.  In a move to “streamline 
quasi-judicial and purely judicial issues”, future Industrial Court Chairmen will most 
                                                 
21 Metal Industry Employees Union v Registrar of Trade Unions [1976] 1 MLJ 220. 
22 Hong Leogn Equipment Sdn Bhd v Liew Fook Chuean  [1996] 1 MLJ 481; R Rama Chandran v The 
Industrial Court [1997] 1 MLJ 145. 
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 likely consist of officers from the Attorney-General’s Chambers.  Currently, the 
Industrial Court is comprised of a panel of persons representing employers and a 
panel of persons representing workmen, all of whom are appointed by the Minister.  
Prior to such appointment, the Minister normally consults organisations representing 
employers and workmen. 
 
It has been acknowledged that this will most likely “render future industrial 
disputes” more technical.23  The Malaysian Trades Union Congress, in opposing the 
move, expressed its concern that this will drastically change the character of the 
Industrial Court: “The Industrial Court normally makes decisions by placing more 
importance on employers and employees’ interest rather than on the technicalities of 
the law.  Workers will lose out if the change is enforced-disputes can then only be 
settled by a protracted legal battle.”24   
 
Thus, while ADR has been seen to be gaining momentum as an effective 
method of dispute settlement in other fields, such as consumer cases, it is greatly 
under threat in the field of labour disputes. 
 
                                                 
23 Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department responsible for law – quoted in “The Sun”, 23 July 
2001. 
24 MTUC Secretary General, quoted in “The Sun”, 23 July 2001. 
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